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Principles of Risk Assessment:
Sentencing and Policing
Christopher Slobogin*
Risk assessment-measuring an individual's potential for offending-has
long been an important aspect of criminal justice, especially in connection with
sentencing, pretrial detention, and police decision-making. To aid in the risk
assessment inquiry, a number of states have recently begun relying on statisticallyRAls are
derived algorithms called "risk assessment instruments" (RAls).'
generally thought to be more accurate than the type of seat-of-the-pants risk
assessment in which judges, parole boards, and police officers have traditionally
engaged.2 But RAls bring with them their own set of controversies.
In recognition of these concerns, this brief paper proposes three principlesthe fit principle, the validity principle, and the fairness principle-that should
govern risk assessment in criminal cases. After providing examples of RAls, it
elaborates on how the principles would affect their use in sentencing and policing.
While space constraints preclude an analysis of pretrial detention, the discussion
should make evident how the principles would work in that setting as well.

* Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. This paper was
prepared for The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Round Table on Big Data and
Criminal Law. The author would like to thank the participants at that conference as well as
participants in faculty workshops at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law and the
University of Washington Law School for their input on this paper.
I On sentencing, see Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based
Corrections, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 566-67 (2015) (providing cites); on pretrial detention, see
(George Mason Legal Research
Megan T. Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action 8-15,
88
[https://perma.cc/BDF6-Z5UY]; on
Paper No. LS 17-25, 2018), https://ssm.com/abstract-30160
policing, see Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109,
1126-42 (2017).
2 N. Zoe Hilton, Grant T. Harris & Marnie E. Rice, Sixty-Six Years of Research on the
Clinical Versus Actuarial Prediction of Violence, 34 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 400, 400-01

(2006). But see Julia J. Dressel, Accuracy and Racial Biases of Recidivism Prediction Instruments,
(May 31, 2017) (senior honors thesis, Dartmouth Computer Science Technical Report TR2017-822),
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/farid/downloads/publications/Jdthesisl7.pdf [http://perma.cc/TQM2-7E
431 (finding no difference in lay and statistical predictive accuracy, but using a methodology that in
essence converted the lay prediction into an algorithm).
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I. RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS

Today, there are a huge number of RAls, some developed by the government
and some by researchers at universities or private companies.
In the space
allotted, justice cannot be done to the wide array of such instruments. But the
three RAIs described here provide enough background to acquaint the reader with
the nature of data-based risk assessment and different ways of approaching it.
A relatively new RAI is the Oxford Risk of Recidivism Tool, nicknamed
OxRec. 4 According to its initial validation study, the OxRec was able to identify a
"high risk" group, 60% of whom committed a violent offense within a two-year
period, a "medium risk" group with a 30% recidivism rate over two years, and a
"low risk" group that had less than a 10% recidivism rate within that period.5 In
the world of risk assessment, these are good results. An instrument that can
reliably differentiate between groups with 60% and 10% recidivism rates-and
whose high risk group includes only 40% non-recidivists and whose low risk
group includes only 10% recidivists-is state of the art.
The OxRec relies on weighted "risk factors," which is typical of RAls. But
the OxRec is noteworthy because it considers so many risk factors, including
environmental variables that other instruments do not consider. Here is the full list
of OxRec risk factors: male sex; unemployed before prison; young age; nonimmigrant status; previous prison sentence of short duration; violent index crime;
previous violent crime; never married; fewer years of education; low disposable
income; alcohol use disorder; drug use disorder; any mental disorder; any severe
mental disorder; and "high neighbourhood deprivation," which is determined using
rates or measures of welfare recipiency, migration status, divorce, educational
levels, residential mobility, crime, and disposable income within the individual's
neighborhood. 6 The rationale for inclusion of these factors, some of them counterintuitive, is strictly statistical.
A much older instrument, the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), is
used extensively in Canada and in several U.S. jurisdictions. It relies on twelve
risk factors, having to do with the individual's score on the Psychopathy Checklist
(a measure of psychopathy that takes into account criminal history); elementary
school misconduct; diagnosis (with personality disorders positively, and
3

T. Douglas et al., Risk Assessment Tools in CriminalJustice and Forensic Psychiatry:
The
Need for Better Data, 42 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 134, 134 (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.eurpsy.2016.12.009 [http://perma.cc/HZZ6-DWAT] (stating there are over 200 such tools).
4 Seena Fazel et al., Predictionof Violent Reoffending on Release from Prison:
Derivation
and External Validation of a Scalable Tool, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 535, 540 (2016) (referring to
OxRec at https://oxrisk.com/oxrec/ [http://perma.cc/A25Q-T92V]).
s Id. at 541 fig.4.
6 Id. at 537 tbl.1.
7 For a description of the instrument and relevant
research, see Grant T. Harris et al.,
Prospective Replication of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide in Predicting Violent Recidivism
Among ForensicPatients, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 377 (2002).
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schizophrenia negatively, correlated with risk); age; presence of parents in home
before age 16; performance on conditional release (if any); non-violent offenses;
8
marital status; victim injury; victim gender; and history of alcohol abuse. The
evaluator assigns a numerical score in connection with each risk factor according
to a statistically-derived table. Scores can range from less than -21 to more than
28, with the lowest score predicting a 0% chance of violent offending within seven
years and the highest score predicting a 100% chance of violent offending within
that period.9 Seven other "bins" or ranges are associated with recidivism
probabilities of 8% through 76%.io
One measure of the accuracy of RAIs like the VRAG is provided by the
"receiver operating characteristic curve," which is derived by plotting the true
positive rate over the false positive rate." If the resulting curve follows the left
vertical axis and then the upper horizontal axis (like a non-capitalized "r"), the area
under the curve (AUC) would be 1.0, indicating that the instrument is 100%
accurate. If, instead, the curve ends up being a 45-degree diagonal from the lower
left corner to the upper right corner of the plot, the AUC would be 0.5, indicating
that the RAI is no better than chance at differentiating true positives from true
negatives. A typical AUC value for the VRAG is 0.75,12 indicating that there is a
75% chance that a person who recidivates received a higher score on the VRAG
than a person who did not recidivate.
The third instrument described here is the HCR-20.1 3 As the name implies,
this RAI consists of 20 risk factors, ten having to do with historical matters, five
relating to clinical symptoms, and five relating to risk management or treatment.
The historical factors are previous violence; age at first violent incident;
relationship instability; employment problems; substance use problems; major
mental illness; psychopathy; early maladjustment; personality disorder; and prior
supervision failure.' 4 The clinical factors are lack of insight; negative attitudes;
active symptoms of major mental illness; impulsivity; and unresponsiveness to
treatment.15 The risk management factors are unfeasibility of plans; exposure to
destabilizers; lack of personal support; noncompliance with remediation attempts;
8

Id. at 378.

&

9 Id. at 385 tbl.2.
10 Id.
1 See Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About
Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 784-85 (1994) (describing this method of
measuring the accuracy of risk assessment).
12 See Majid Bani-Yaghoub et al., A Time Series Modeling Approach in Risk Appraisal of
Violent and Sexual Recidivism, 34 LAW & HuM. BEHAv. 349, 359 (2010).
13
For a description of this instrument and accompanying research, see Kevin S. Douglas
Christopher D. Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: Concurrent Validity in a
Sample ofIncarceratedOffenders, 26 CRtl. JUST. & BEHAV. 3, 8 (1999).
14

id.

15

Id.
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and stress.
Each of the 20 factors is scored on a scale of 0-2, so that the
maximum total score is 40 (although the developers of the HCR-20 counsel that a
strictly mathematical assessment should be avoided and that, instead, individuals
should simply be characterized as "high," "medium," or "low" risk).17
One key difference between the HCR-20 and the other two instruments is that
the HCR-20 explicitly looks at the individual's potential for rehabilitation and
likelihood of following treatment plans. Research on the HCR-20 indicates that it
has AUC values similar to or higher than the VRAG.' 8 One study found that
individuals with scores of 1-14 on the HCR-20 reoffended at about an 11% rate
within two years, while those with scores of 27 or higher reoffended at about a
75% rate within two years.' 9
These three instruments are relatively typical. Some RAls rely on fewer risk
factors, and all vary in the extent to which they consider "static" factors that the
defendant can do nothing about (like prior crimes or age) and "dynamic" risk
factors that are changeable (like substance abuse or impulsivity). 20

But the

foregoing account of RAls is sufficient for purposes of assessing their role in
sentencing.
II. THREE PRINCIPLES OF RISK ASSESSMENT

The question this section addresses is whether instruments like the OxRec, the
VRAG, and the HCR-20 should play a role in deciding whether a person should be
incarcerated, receive a sentence enhancement, or be eligible for early release (RAls
and policing are taken up in the next section). One could easily answer this
question negatively on the ground that risk should never play a role in sentencing,
for a number of philosophical and practical reasons that I have addressed
elsewhere.21 And even if risk is a legitimate sentencing issue, one might resist
using RAls because their quantified, mechanistic nature dehumanizes the process.
This article will assume, however, that risk is permissibly considered at the
dispositional stage and that, because they produce more accurate, consistent, and
transparent conclusions about risk, RAls should be preferred over unstructured
clinical judgment. Even on these assumptions, the usefulness of RAls must be
16

id.

17

Id.

Laura S. Guy et al., Influence of the HCR-20, LS/CMI, and PCL-R on Decisions About
ParoleSuitability Among Lifers, 39 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 232, 235-38 (2015).
18

19 Kevin S. Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric Patients: The
HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: Screening Version, 67 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 917, 924-25, tbl.7 (1999).
2o A popular RAI that consists of only six factors, all of them static and most linked to
offending, is the Static-99 (Revised). See Static-99/Static-99R, STATIC 99 CLEARINGHOUSE, http://
www.static99.org/ [http://perma.cc/C4FB-VNKC] (last visited Feb. 18, 2018).
21 See Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the
Primary Goal of Sentencing: The Modern
Casefor IndeterminateDispositionsin CriminalCases, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1127 (20 1).
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carefully analyzed. The assertion here is that, in choosing RAls, courts and parole
boards should be governed by three principles-the fit principle, the validity
principle, and the fairness principle. Application of these principles suggests that
RAls will rarely meet the requirements a legal system should demand from risk
assessment tools.
A. The Fit Principle
The fit principle, which can be gleaned from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. ,22 posits that RAls ought to address
the precise legal question at issue. While psychologists have done good work
devising RAls, they have not always paid attention to what the law needs. Of
course, the bulk of the blame for this failing rests not on the scientists but on the
courts, because judges have not been clear about what the legal issues are, nor have
they forced psychologists, through evidentiary rulings, to address them.
What types of questions should RAls be answering? First, the outcome
variable used in validating the RAI ought to reflect the seriousness of what is at
stake-in this case, incarceration or an enhanced sentence. Thus, I would assert
23
(along with many others) that even a high risk of minor criminal behavior should
not affect the decision about incarceration. If one accepts that position, research
on these instruments ought to use serious violence, not just any violence, as the
outcome measure. Many RAls may fall short in this regard. For instance, the
outcome measure in the original validation research for the VRAG included a
simple assault. 2 4 A risk of that type of violence is an insufficient basis by itself to
justify incarceration or sentence enhancement.
Second, the prediction period associated with the RAI should fit.. legal
requirements. Recall that the VRAG predicts violence within a seven-year period,
while the OxRec and HCR-20 predict within two years. Since many statutory
sentence ranges end well before seven years, that period is far too long for any
rational sentencing regime. And even two years may be too long. While a regime
that delays parole hearings for several years is probably not unconstitutional,
parole decisions are normally based on a mixture of retributive and utilitarian
considerations. In the pure preventive detention context, in contrast, the Supreme
26
To the
Court has held that routine periodic review is constitutionally required.
perhaps
routine,
be
also
extent a sentence is preventive in nature, the review should

22
23

509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
See, e.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER,

PREVENTIVE JUSTICE

260 (2014).

24

Harris et al., supra note 7, at 383.

25

Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 251 (2000) (upholding an eight-year delay against an ex

post facto challenge but also noting such delay would not be permissible if it "creates a significant

risk of prolonging [the offender's] incarceration").
26
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1997).
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on an annual basis.27 That would mean that neither the VRAG nor the OxRec or
HCR-20 provide sufficient legal fit in this regard.
Third, to the extent a sentence is based on risk, a number of Supreme Court
opinions can be read to require that the disposition must be the least restrictive
means of achieving the state's preventive aim.28 Algorithmic studies should help
the court assess not only risk levels but also whether something less restrictive than
prison, such as a halfway house, ankle bracelets, surveillance, or outpatient
treatment, can achieve the state's preventive goal. In other words, risk instruments
ought to address risk management as well as risk assessment. While the HCR-20
provides such information, neither the OxRec nor the VRAG do so.
Finally, RAIs ought to be able to provide specific probability estimates of an
offender's risk. Ideally, groups with a very high probability of offending could be
identified. Given the state of the predictive art, however, identifying groups
associated with anything over a 75% chance of recidivating is probably impossible,
and even if the goal is merely meeting the preponderance standard (51%), the
designated group is likely to be very small in number.
Some American
jurisdictions have dealt with this problem through manipulating the definition of
dangerousness.
For instance, under the Texas death penalty scheme, the
aggravating factor of dangerousness is proven only if the state can show beyond a
reasonable doubt "whether there is a probability that" a capital murder offender
"would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society."2 9 Technically, that language means that the state need only show
beyond a reasonable doubt a 51% likelihood that the person will reoffend, a much
easier task than proving beyond doubt that the person will reoffend. Whether such
a showing suffices as a normative matter is a tough question, although Texas (and
the U.S. Supreme Court)30 has answered it in the affirmative.
B. The Validity Principle

The second principle that should govern algorithmic sentencing requires that
risk assessment provide reliable risk estimates. Of course, under Daubert, at a
minimum a validity requirement mandates that the instrument be developed in a
methodologically sophisticated way and that its psychometric properties be

See id. at 364 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1994),
which required annual
evaluations, reports, and hearings).
28
See Slobogin, supra note 21, at 1138-40 (describing Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); and Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001), and
arguing that they announce a less-drastic-means requirement where the government's goal is
prevention).
29
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071.2(b)-(c)
(2017).
30 The Court upheld the Texas death penalty
statute in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76
(1976).
27
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evaluated on a routine basis. 31 But it should also require experts to offer, and
courts to consider, more specific external and internal validity metrics.
With respect to external validity, the RAI should be normed on a population
that matches the target of the intervention. The VRAG was originally normed in
Canada, which made its use problematic in the U.S. until it was validated on more
diverse U.S. populations.32 Likewise, an instrument normed on sex offenders
should not be used to predict recidivism among other types of offenders. Ideally,
the RAI's reference group will be highly similar to the individual being assessed in
33
terms of both demographic characteristics and criminal charges.
Internal validity is equally important. On this score, courts could, and I would
argue should, demand AUC values of somewhere near 0.75 when the instrument is
being used to adjust confinement. That number is not chosen arbitrarily. In
Addington v. Texas,34 the Supreme Court held that a mentally ill person may not be
detained on dangerousness grounds on less than clear and convincing evidence,
which is conventionally quantified as a 75% level of certainty. If a person cannot
be involuntarily hospitalized without that degree of confidence, at least that much
should be required before an offender may be preventively detained in prison. In
AUC terms, that means that courts should not only require whatever level of
probability the clear and convincing standard dictates under the fit principle but
also require that any RAI they use accurately distinguishes high and low risk
offenders roughly 75% of the time.
C. The FairnessPrinciple
Fairness is, of course, a broad concept, and could include the fitness and
validity principles just discussed. Here, however, it is meant to focus solely on
concerns triggered by the traditional assumption that criminal justice dispositions
35
should be related to blameworthy conduct. For instance, in Buck v. Davis, the
Supreme Court stated:
It would be patently unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant
is liable to be a future danger because of his race.

. .

. [That would be] a

disturbing departure from a basic premise of our criminal justice system:
36
Our law punishespeoplefor what they do, not who they are.
31 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993) (requiring the basis
of scientific testimony be subject to scientific testing that provides error rates).
32 See Harris et at., supra note 7, at 381.
33 The argument has been made that, even under such circumstances, group-to-individual
assessments are not possible. But that argument is fallacious. See Peter B. lmrey & A. Philip Dawid,
A Commentary on Statistical Assessment of Violence Recidivism Risk, 2 STAT. & PUB. POL'Y 25
(2015).
34 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).

"
36

137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
Id. at 775, 778 (emphasis added).
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Taken literally, the italicized language would seem to prohibit all sentences
based on risk-which is ultimately about status, not conduct-or at least only
allow such sentences if the relevant risk factors focus on prior crimes. However,
the Supreme Court probably does not mean its statement to be taken literally. In
other cases (and implicitly in Buck itself), the Court has even upheld death
sentences based on dangerousness. 37 Buck v. Davis appears to be a case about
race, not risk.
That does not mean that the concern expressed by the Court is irrelevant. The
concern comes in two forms-the discrimination claim and the dignity claim. The
first part of the above-quoted language in Buck is most clearly related to the
discrimination claim and, on the surface, it seems like a strong one. Although
RAIs do not explicitly consider race, they usually do distinguish between offenders
based on other immutable or near-immutable characteristics, such as gender, age,
diagnosis, and various factors related to poverty. So, one might argue, sentences
based on these RAIs discriminate on the basis of suspect, quasi-suspect, or quasiquasi-suspect classes.
One response to this concern is that statistician- or mechanistically-derived
RAls demonstrate no "animus" toward any of these classes, a showing that is
usually required before constitutional discrimination is found.3 9 A second is that
even intentional racial discrimination is permissible when necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that other forms of intentional discrimination usually
require only a rational or significant justification-here, protecting the public and
efficiently allocating resources.4 0
But one does not have to wade into that morass to see why the discrimination
claim is hard to make out. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in State v.
Loomis 4 1 makes the point. In Loomis, the court was faced with a challenge to an
RAI called the COMPAS, which, like the OxRec, includes maleness as a risk
factor. To the argument that a sentence cannot be based on such a characteristic,
37 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). In Buck, the expert relied
on seven
"statistical factors"; race was the only factor the Court found constitutionally impermissible. 137 S.
Ct. at 768, 775.
This is the argument of Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based
Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REv. 803, 805 (2014) ("1 show that several of the
variables that many of the instruments use raise serious constitutional and normative concerns, and I
review the empirical literature to show that the instruments do not advance state interests sufficiently
38

to overcome those concerns.").

39 Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in
the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1193 (2017) ("Equal protection challenges to

machine learning will, in short, likely fail at the first step of analysis that demands a finding that
algorithms that include or analyze class-related variables are intentionally discriminatory.").
40 See generally, Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE OXFoRD
HANDBOOK OF
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 196, 204-,5 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012).
4'

881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
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fails to
the court stated: "[I]t appears that any risk assessment tool which
2 Because
genders."4
both
differentiate between men and women will misclassify
the removal of gender from its calculus would mean that the COMPAS would
actually lead to inaccurate gender distinctions in sentencing (with women being
rated as higher risk and men as lower risk than they actually are), the defendant's
claim failed.
A more compelling discrimination-related concern is that RAls may
inaccurately rely on immutable factors. This was the argument made in a
ProPublicaarticle reporting a study about the COMPAS-the same RAI that was
at issue in Loomis-showing that the instrument produced disproportionately more
43
false positives among blacks than whites. The response to this concern is more
complicated but boils down to this: if African-Americans are more likely to
commit crime than whites, a well-constructed RAI that relies heavily on prior
crimes will inevitably produce a greater percentage of false positives among
blacks.44 Trying to reduce those false positives will probably increase the
percentage of false negatives who are black and also increase the number offalse
positives who are white.
So the real question for the statistician is whether the predicate condition
stated above-that African Americans commit more crimes than other racial
groups-is correct. If police arrest, prosecutors charge, or juries and judges
convict in racially-driven ways, it may not be. Or perhaps the predicate is correct
45
with respect to some crimes like drug offenses but not others. Ultimately, this
question needs to be resolved if the discrimination concern is to be taken seriously.
The second fairness concern focuses not on discrimination per se but on
dignity, or as the Supreme Court put it in Buck, the "basic premise of our criminal
justice system [that] [o]ur law punishes people for what they do, not who. they

42

Id. at 766.

&

43 See Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.
propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [http://perma.cc/JZ2P-U
J6H].
See Avi Feller et al., A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was
4
Clear., WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016),
Labeled Biased Against Blacks. It's Actually Not That
2
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/ 016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our[http://perma.cc/3BRK-F3
analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas/?utmterm-.c3eec3904d97
BA] (making the mathematical point that even if "[w]ithin each risk category, the proportion of
defendants who reoffend is approximately the same regardless of race . . if black defendants have a
higher overall recidivism rate, then a greater share of black defendants will be classified as high
risk.").
45 Lowenkamp and Skeem's study of the Post Conviction Risk Assessment tool found no
evidence of "bias predicting bias" (i.e., "biased criminal history records predicting biased future
police decisions") and concluded that criminal history is not a proxy for race. Jennifer Skeem
Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, & Recidivism: Predictive Bias and DisparateImpact 29, 35
[http://perma.cc/DX9D-HF
(2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2687339
WK]. But they did not separate out specific offenses within criminal history.

592

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol. 15:583

are."4 As Andrew von Hirsch framed the point over thirty years earlier, "[u]nless
the person actually made the wrongful choice he was predicted to make, he ought
not be condemned for that choice-and hence should not suffer punishment for
it."a
As suggested above, perhaps that sentiment would permit not only
punishment for the current crime but enhancement of that sentence based on prior
crimes-an issue about which von Hirsch and others have spilled much ink.48 But
it would not permit punishment to be based on anything else. Thus, risk factors
such as gender, diagnosis, parental presence, employment status, and marital
status-even if not discriminatory-would be off-limits because of their insult to
autonomy. Not only are these factors not crimes, but many cannot even be called
"behavior" chosen by the individual. And the OxRec's neighborhood score moves
even further from Buck's "basic premise" by considering the status and behavior of
others, over which the offender clearly has no control.
That argument has a strong intuitive appeal, even in a sentencing regime
which, as is the case in every American jurisdiction,4 9 permits risk to influence
release only within a retributively-defmed sentencing range. However, if as this
article is assuming, risk is a legitimate sentencing factor, the argument is
irrelevant; the premise that punishment is only about what people have done no
longer applies (as the Supreme Court's affirmation of death sentences based on
dangerousness confirms).
Risk assessments are orthogonal to culpability
assessments, both conceptually (the first is forward-looking, the second backwardlooking), and practically (for instance, a single prior robbery conviction might call
for more enhancement on desert grounds than on risk grounds).
There are also two practical problems with von Hirsch's stance. First,
removal of all non-crime factors from an RAI is likely to substantially reduce
accuracy. And second, as noted above, it is likely to increase discrimination. A
young male with psychopathic tendencies and one prior crime represents a much
higher risk than an older female suffering from schizophrenia who has committed
the same crime; yet, under von Hirsch's approach, both would be treated
identically.
A more nuanced approach would balance the incremental validity provided by
a given risk factor with fairness concerns. As Buck v. Davis held, race should
never be a risk factor.50 Other noncriminal risk factors should be included in an
RAI only if they appreciably improve predictive validity. This limitation would
probably still permit reliance on variables such as age and gender, since they
appear to improve accuracy significantly. Marital and employment status, in
46

Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017).

47 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRiMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS
IN
THE SENTENCING OF CRI1MINALS 11 (1985).

See, e.g., id. at 131-36.
Richard S. Frase, Theories of Proportionalityand Desert, in
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 131, 144-46.
'o Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775.
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contrast, may not add much incremental validity and thus might be impermissible
considerations.51 The same might be true of risk factors based on neighborhood.
Remember, however, that the factors included in RAIs are there because they are
statistically correlated with risk. Thus, a normative judgment must be made about
when a level of correlation is so low it requires a factor's exclusion.
To minimize further any affront to dignity associated with RAls, risk
assessment should be based as much as possible on dynamic or "causal risk
factors," such as drug abuse or impulsivity (a goal better achieved by the HCR-20
than the OxRec or the VRAG). These are risk factors that can be changed through
intervention and thus focus on traits that the person can do something about. This
aspect of the fairness principle dovetails with the fit principle's requirement that
algorithmic risk assessment provides output relevant to risk management. Also
consistent with this point, researchers should endeavor to include in their algorithm
protective factors that reduce risk, as the VRAG does with schizophrenia. Further,
as a procedural matter, defendants should be able to present their own evidence of
protective factors.52
D. Summary
The fit, validity, and fairness principles are very demanding in their idealized
form. Some leniency in their application will be necessary if RAIls are to be used
at all. But courts and parole boards making evidentiary decisions about RAls or
basing decisions on them ought to ensure these principles heavily influence
outcomes.
III. THE THREE PRINCIPLES AND POLICING

In recent years, RAls have also crept into the investigative phase of the
The lessons learned from sentencing are directly
criminal justice system.
applicable to this setting. If applied conscientiously, the fit, validity, and fairness
principles would place significant restrictions on the use of algorithms in
policework, just as they would at sentencing.
Two examples of policing RAIs illustrate the challenge. The Chicago Police
Department's "Heat List" relies on eleven risk factors, such as criminal history,
parole status, and gang status, to generate "risk scores" from 1 to 500, with 500
s' For an example of a bivariate relationship between violence and several types of risk
factors based on a study focused on the relationship of mental disorder and violence, see
MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & THE LAW, THE MAcARTHUR VIOLENCE

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY (Apr. 2001), http://macarthur.virginia.edu/risk.html [http://perma.cc/5QLN3ETP].
52

See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, AND
SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 125-29 (2006) (arguing the

state's proof of risk should be limited to probability estimates based on RAls unless the defendant
proffers clinical information).
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being the highest risk.13 Various private companies claim to be able to do
something similar, with instruments boasting names like Digital Stakeout, Predpol,
HunchLab, and Beware. Beware, developed by a company called Intrado, purports
to analyze billions of data points about an individual, including property records,
commercial databases, recent purchases, and social media posts, to assign "threat
scores" within a matter of seconds.5 4
The idea behind most of these devices is that they come into play after police
identify a possible wrongdoer using traditional means, through observation of
suspicious activity or eyewitness reports. The RAI is then used to help figure out
whether to surveil, stop and frisk, or arrest the individual. If the algorithm is
combined with facial recognition technology, the officer can discover the person's
risk level without even having a name. These instruments are touted as a way of
making policing safer and also less intrusive, since cops should not frisk a low-risk
person (at least in theory). But the fit, validity, and fairness principles would curb
their use in a number of ways.
As in the sentencing context, the fit principle would require that policing
RAls be aimed at predicting risk of serious criminal activity, at least at the felony
level. Further, in contrast to the sentencing context, in the investigative setting the
Supreme Court has generally demanded that the danger predicted is imminent,s
meaning the algorithm should be used only to identify either an incipient crime hot
spot or, as just discussed, the risk level of a person who is linked to a recent or
soon-to-occur crime by virtue of being in the relevant vicinity. Otherwise, police
could use RAIs to confront the same person repeatedly without any objective
indicator that the confrontation is necessary at that particular point in time. In
sentencing, the impact of the risk assessment is automatically limited by the
requirement of a conviction. The principle of legality, if not Fourth Amendment
case law, demands something similar in the investigative setting.56
With respect to the validity principle, the police should have to demonstrate
that the RAI is validated on a relevant population and can generate hit rates (true
positives) sufficient to justify the nature of the action the police plan to take. If
police want to arrest based on the RAI, for instance, the algorithm should have a
53 See Jessica Saunders, Priscillia Hunt & John S. Hollywood, PredictionsPut into
Practice:
A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of Chicago's Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 347 (2016) (describing Chicago's Strategic Subjects List and reporting a study finding
it was an ineffective crime-fighting technique).
54 Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating
Your Threat
'Score,' WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-newway-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8el 5-1 1e5-baf4bdf37355da0c_story.html?utmterm=.e3lca039afaf [http://perma.cc/43UD-7M9R].
5
See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1985) (reasoning the principles of
Terry v. Ohio generally limit stops on reasonable suspicion to situations involving "imminent or
ongoing crimes" or a known "completed felony").
56 See Christopher Slobogin, A JurisprudenceofDangerousness,
98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 17-26
(2003).
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high hit rate. If, instead, they plan to stop and frisk an individual, perhaps the
police should have to show that one out of three flagged by the profile have just
perpetrated, are perpetrating, or will soon perpetrate a serious crime; that
requirement is based on a survey finding that, on average, federal judges equated a
57
30% level of certainty with the reasonable suspicion required for a stop.

If,

instead, the government plans to conduct covert surveillance, the hit rate should be
proportionate to the intensity of surveillance. Surveillance of long duration might
58
require at least a 50% hit rate, a number derived from United States v. Jones,
where five justices indicated that "prolonged" tracking-in Jones, it was 28 daysrequires probable cause, often quantified at roughly a more-likely-than-not level of
certainty.
With respect to the fairness principle, the primary concern might be
transparency. The risk factors in most sentencing RAIs are well-known, which
explains why this paper was able to report them. In contrast, most of the
companies that have developed policing RAIs, like Intrado, will not reveal their
60
algorithms, citing proprietary interests. If risk factors and their relevant weights
are not disclosed, the extent to which they incorporate proxies for race-or race
itself-cannot be known, and the incremental validity of a given risk factor cannot
be subject to independent verification. Accordingly, courts should be empowered
to force disclosure of the relevant codes, in camera if necessary, just as they can
force disclosure of any confidential informants who are crucial to the defendant's
case. 6 1 If, upon disclosure, it is discovered that the RAI unfairly uses proxies for
race or inaccurately relies on other suspect characteristics, the RAI should be
adjusted accordingly; if accuracy is thereby diminished, so be it.
What if the police want to use the RAI in a preemptive way, for instance, by
tracking down people identified by the Chicago Heat List? Here all three
principles come into play. The predicted risk should be serious and imminent (fit).
If the police contemplate stopping people identified by the Heat List, the predicted
hit rate should be in the 30% range; if instead, they only plan to conduct short-term
surveillance, a lower hit rate would suffice (validity). But to ensure fairness,
police should treat everyone identified by the RAI equally, meaning either that all
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1293, 1327-28 (1982) (summarizing a survey of
federal judges).
ss 565 U.S. 400, 430-31 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
59 See McCauliff, supra note 57, at 1327; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.3(b) (5th ed. 2009).
60 Jouvenal, supra note 54.
61
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957). While Roviaro has been narrowly
construed, it provides a possible basis, under the Compulsory Process Clause, for an argument that
algorithms that determine a defendant's fate are discoverable. See Zathrina Zasell Gutierrez Perez,
Note, Piercingthe Veil of Informant Confidentiality: The Role of In Camera Hearings in the Roviaro
Determination, 46 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 179, 202-13 (2009) (describing and critiquing federal circuit
approaches to Roviaro).
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who fit the profile are confronted or that people are targeted on a pre-specified
basis, such as every fifth person (fairness). The precedent for this requirement
comes from the Supreme Court's checkpoint jurisprudence, which requires that
people stopped at roadblocks be selected on a neutral basis. 62 Unless this rule is
followed, the biases that algorithms are meant to prevent will simply be
reintroduced when police make the decision about whom to stop.
CONCLUSION

Further discussion of many of the ideas broached above can be found
elsewhere. 63 The point to be emphasized here is that if risk assessment is a
legitimate state exercise, it needs to be cabined by principles that demand that the
methods used to implement it are legally germane, accurate, and fairly applied.

See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979) (distinguishing
"[flor Fourth
Amendment purposes . . . between sporadic and random stops of individual vehicles making their
way through city traffic and those stops occasioned by roadblocks where all vehicles are brought to a
halt or to a near halt, and all are subjected to a show of the police power of the community."). See
generally Christopher Slobogin, Policing, Databases, and Surveillance: Five Regulatory Categories,
12-13 (Nat'l Const. Ctr. White Paper Series, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract-2947948 [http:/perma.
cc/JMZ4-PVBR] (explaining the advantages of such an approach).
63
See Slobogin, supra notes 21, 40, 56 & 62.
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